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THE USES OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS TO
INFORM CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
Gordon A. Christenson *
Recent federal court of appeals decisions have relied on funda-
mental human fights norms to inform' constitutional interpretation.u
This comment reviews the reasoning in those cases to identify possible
constitutional uses of fundamental human rights norms and to suggest
some conceptual framework for their use.3 The need for such a frame-
work is illustrated by the cases themselves, which seem disparate and
disjointed, with no discernable coherent philosophy, though each
makes good sense when considered alone.
ESTABLISHING FEDERAL JURISDICTION
The need for a conceptual framework is reflected in the confusion
* Nippert, Professor and Dean, College of Law, University of Cincinnati. I wish to
thank Wendy Ellis, fellow, Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights at the College of
Law, for her research assistance in the preparation of this article.
I. The term "inform" is used throughout this article to signify the use of positive
sources of international human rights law to aid in the interpretation of constitutional ques-
tions involving similar fundamental rights protected under the Bill of Rights. These sources
can serve to emphasize the importance of a particular constitutional right. Although such an
argument might be made, I do not need to claim that these positive sources of international
law are autonomous rules or authorities that limit federal or state power. Rather, these
sources show that an argument rooted in one of the first eight amendments, or other consti-
tutional provisions dealing with individual rights, gain importance through a context that
claims to be universally recognized.
2. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F.
Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), afld 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
3. This first attempt at framing valid constitutional guidance through legitimate uses
of human rights norms is part of a larger work which will set forth in greater detail a concep-
tual framework for federal courts in human rights cases. This comment looks at three cases
to illustrate that no adequate framework exists and proposes one for use in the future. This
framework is, however, only one aspect of a thesis which will suggest that through use of the
exercise of federal jurisdiction, the Ninth Amendment, the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the open-ended clauses of the Constitution, and the federal
common law, human rights norms can be introduced to inform constitutional interpretation
in a limited, craftsmanlike way, even though the United States has ratified few of the inter-
national human rights conventions.
"Open-ended provisions" refers to those provisions of the Constitution "that are diffi-
cult to read responsibly as anything other than quite broad invitations to import into the
constitutional decision process considerations that will not be found in the language of the
amendment or the debates that led up to it." J. ELY, DEmoCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THE-
ORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 14 (1980). Examples are the First, Ninth, Fourteenth Amend-
ments, and the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment. See
id at 11-41.
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of tongues from the commentators spawned by Judge Kaufman's opin-
ion in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.4 The law review commentators offer an
excellent analytical framework,' but provide too little creative or con-
ceptual thought, as they either overstate or trivialize the decision.
Their attempts to link the decision to the broader context of case law
and literature are unhelpful, due either to overly broad ideological ver-
biage or narrow, hypertechnical analysis.
Human rights advocates claim more than is necessary to help their
cause in saying that Judge Kaufman's opinion, from the prestigious
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, has established a seminal position for
human rights in the domestic courts.6 They state an aspiration-that
the human rights law contained in international covenants, even
though not in force in the United States, is now part of federal common
law and is thereby enforceable under federal jurisdiction. Because
some, but not all of those rights have become part of customary inter-
national law and hence part of federal common law, the claim is too
broad. At the other pole, some student comments assert that relations
between an individual and a state are no affair of international law,
and that international law cannot establish a private cause of action.'
They, too, miss the point.
4. 630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980).
5. See Blum & Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights
Claims. The Alien Tort Claims Act after Fiartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53
(1981); Note, The Alien Tort Statute.- InternationalLaw as the Rule ofDecision, 49 FORDHAM
L. REV. 874 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Alien Tort Statute]; 49 CIN. L. REV. 880 (1980); 15
GA. L. REV. 504 (1981); 33 STAN. L. REV. 353 (1981).
6. "What is truly significant about the Filartiga decision is the court's acceptance of
international human rights law as part of the law of our country, governing the duties of all
states and the rights of all people." I The Law Group Docket 7 (published by the Interna-
tional Human Rights Law Group (Spring 1981)).
7. "The effect of Filartiga is to direct American lawyers and judges to international
sources of the rights of litigants." Id
8. International law is a horizontal legal order limited by reciprocal enforcement,
while supranational law is a hierarchical, coercive system like that prevalent in a
national context. Protection of the human rights of an individual from actions of
his government requires a hierarchical, coercive system. Because of the protection
of fundamental rights on a worldwide basis would require a supranational enforce-
ment structure, only supranational law can confer such rights. 49 CIN. L. REv.,
supra note 5, at 890-91.
International human rights law is generally only normative; it rarely provides
enforcement procedures or rights of action. . . . [Nations] have not agreed to let
alleged violations within their borders be tried and punished in the courts of other
countries, nor have they agreed to enforcement proceedings initiated by private
individuals. . . . [P]rovisions of the law of nations that derive from custom or
convention, rather than from treaties, do not create private rights of action unless
such rights are part of the custom or convention. 33 STAN. L. REV., supra note 5, at
358.
For the viewpoint that international law does confer rights on individuals, see Note,
Federal Jurisdiction and the Protection of International Human Rights, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 199, 214-17 (1979-1980).
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USES OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS
Filartiga did not establish either proposition. Dr. Joel Filartiga
and his daughter, both citizens of Paraguay, brought a wrongful death
action in federal court for the death of the doctor's son, Joelito. 9 Joelito
allegedly was tortured to death at the hands of Paraguay's Inspector
General of Police, America Norberto Pena-Irala, in retaliation for his
father's political activities.10 Pena was served personally with process
in New York while in federal custody pending his deportation for over-
staying his visa."
FEDERAL JURISDICTION DISTINGUISHED FROM RULE OF DECISION
The Second Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the
action for want of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that Article III of
the Constitution authorized the exercise of federal jurisdiction by the
Alien Tort Statute.' 2 While some confusing parts of the decision need
clarification,' 3 a careful study of Judge Kaufman's reasoning leads in-
escapably to the conclusion that he offers a coherent and sound inter-
pretation of the Alien Tort Statute.14 That statute gives the federal
courts original jurisdiction over any civil action for a tort committed
"in violation of the law of nations."' 5 Stated simply, Judge Kaufman's
thesis is that universal customary international law, made part of fed-
eral common law, provides the basis for exercising federal jurisdiction
through the Alien Tort Statute for civil actions brought by aliens and
determined as a preliminary matter on the merits to be violations of
international law.'6 Following an extensive review of international
human rights documents condemning and prohibiting torture, as well
as opinions of noted publicists and other sources of customary interna-
tional law, the court rightly concluded that official torture violates the
law of nations. 7 This conclusion does not require, however, that a fed-
eral court must use human rights norms to create a private cause of
9. 630 F.2d at 878.
10. Id
11. Id at 879.
12. Id at 878, 886.
13. For example, the court's analysis may have been clearer had it more closely ex-
amined the constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute, a question distinct from the statutory
issue of federal jurisdiction. The court did find a constitutional basis for the statute in the
law of nations which have been an integral part of the common law of the United States
since the adoption of the Constitution. Id at 885-86.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976) (corresponds to Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat.
67, 77).
15. The Alien Tort Statute (also referred to as the Alien Tort Claims Act) provides that
original district court jurisdiction extends to any civil action by an alien for a tort only
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. Id
16. 630 F.2d at 880, 885, 887. The Alien Tort Statute's "in violation of" language,
requiring demonstration on the facts of a violation of international law, is a much higher
standard as a threshold test for jurisdiction than the traditionally used "arising under" con-
stitutional language of article III. See note 20 infra.
17. 630 F.2d at 880-84. As Judge Kaufman stated, international law is determined by
1981]
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42 HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 4:39
action. The law of nations, as an integral part of federal common law,
provides the constitutional basis for exercising federal jurisdiction. If a
case is grounded on federal common law, it properly "arises under the
laws of the United States" for Article III purposes. 8 Thus, the exercise
of federal jurisdiction over the subject matter of this suit between two
aliens for a violation of international law-and, hence, federal common
law-was constitutional. 9 The determination of whether the tort rec-
ognized by federal statute also was an act in violation of international
law was not only a constitutional, but also a jurisdictional, question.20
Crossing this jurisdictional threshhold merely allows the judicial power
to be exercised. It does not decide the proper rule of decision.
CHOICE OF LAW: DEFERENCE TO ANOTHER STATE
The second level of significance in Filartiga for use of human
rights norms involves the issues of the act of state doctrine and choice
of law which were raised by the defendant Pena but were not addressed
by the court in any detail.2 1 A district court would need to face these
issues at trial after overcoming anyforum non-conveniens problems.
The act of state doctrine poses the greatest opportunity for confu-
sion in human rights cases. First espoused by Chief Justice Fuller in
Underhill v. Hernandez, a case involving the confiscation of property, it
declares generally that "the courts of one country will not sit in judg-
ment on the acts of the government of another done within its own
territory."' 22 Under this doctrine, when domestic courts in the United
consulting the works of jurists, by the general usage and practice of nations, and by judicial
decisions. Id at 880, citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820);
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); Lopes v. Reedeirei Richard Schroeder, 225 F. Supp.
292, 295 (E.D. Pa. 1963). Accord, Cohen v. Hartman, 490 F. Supp. 517, 518 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
See also, Statute of the International Court of Justice, signed June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060 T.S. No. 993.
18. 630 F.2d at 885-86.
19. Id at 886. A sophisticated analysis of federal interest is necessary to assure that
there is a sufficient nexus for the assertion ofjurisdiction. See Alien Tort Statute, supra note
5, at 876-81; 33 STAN. L. REV., supra note 5, at 355-57.
20. A much stricter standard of jurisdiction is required under the "in violation of" lan-
guage of the Alien Tort Statute than is required under the "arising under" language of
article III. See Comment, 4 Legal Lohengrin. Federal Jurisdiction Under the Alien Tort
ClaimsAct of 1789, 14 U.S.F.L. REv. 105, 108 (1979); Alien Tort Statute, supra note 5, at 875
n.9.
21. The Court distinguished the choice of law issue from the jurisdictional question
actually before the court and stated that the argument regarding the act of state doctrine was
not before the court on appeal. 630 F.2d at 889. The court did comment briefly on each
issue. Id at 889-90.
22. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). Accord, Ricaud v. American
Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 308-10 (1918); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04
(1918). Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964), reaffirmed the
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USES OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS
States are asked to determine the validity of those acts, they should
defer to the Executive.23 If the deference is mechanical, why should it
matter whether the act is to take property or to torture a citizen of the
other country?
The defendant in Filartiga argued the point: If the torture alleged
was an act of the Paraguayan government done within its own territory,
the suit should be barred by the act of state doctrine.24 A viable, ana-
lytic framework must reconcile human rights norms with this argu-
ment. Otherwise, a civil action for torture is treated no differently than
an action based on title to property. A court in the United States is
required to give some respect to the public acts of a state committed
within its own territory. But how much? Domestic courts must protect
the international interest in orderly relations among states, as well as
the interest of the international community in protecting individuals
from barbaric treatment.
It is beyond dispute that the act of official torture in Filarfiga is a
violation of international law which is universally proscribed and con-
demned.25 Here, deference should not come easily. When a lawsuit
involves an area of international law enjoying less than universal con-
sensus, however, as in economic and social matters, a presumption of
wide deference to the Executive would engender the greatest respect for
policies that are diverse.26 In an area where there is consensus, as in
doctrine with respect to a foreign government's expropriation of property within its own
territory.
23. See also a review of the context in Christenson, Book Review, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1001, 1014 (1975).
24. 630 F.2d at 889.
25. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 5, G.A. Res 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/
810 (1948); Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subject to Torture, G.A
Res. 3452,30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975); American Conven-
tion on Human Rights, art. 5, signed Nov. 22, 1969, OAS T.S. No. 36, OAS O.R. OEA/SER.
L/V/II. 23 doc. 21 rev. 6 (1979); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7,
openedfor signature Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16)
52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, art. 3, signed Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (1968).
26. In economic matters, where there is wide diversity among nations,
the international law questions are transferred to the political and economic level
where interests are accommodated by negotiation or market mechanisms. Ques-
tions of international law remain, but it is the proper role of the domestic tribunal
to defer deciding them .... Judicial deference, however, does not always prove
the best course. It would not be inconsistent for the domestic courts to refuse to
defer when there is a question of fundamental human rights at issue. A wide range
of possible cases may present themselves in which a domestic court may be under a
duty to prescribe minimum standards to a foreign state for treating an individual
within its own jurisdiction ....
Christenson, supra note 23, at 1016-1017.
Deference is due in economic matters because of "the confusion of substantive
norms in the economic area that exists as a result of the widespread emergence of
socialism. Domestic courts are not equipped emotionally or technically to cope
19811
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the domain of certain human rights, a narrower deference is necessary,
and the foreign state should be held strictly to the human rights
standard.27
A precursor to this theory, espoused by Professor Falk in 1964,
was adopted by the Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sab-
batino. s Professor Falk's theory29 is good as far as it goes, but it does
not go far enough toward providing guidelines to the courts for deci-
sion-making in cases involving illegitimate diversity in the policies of
two states departing from universal norms. If the two states are at vari-
ance, how does the United States court go about deciding affirmatively
to impose a rule of decision at variance with the law of a foreign state?
Professor Lillich similarly advocates an activist role for the United
States judiciary in determining international law questions without def-
erence, even in economic matters.3 0 His position is consistent and does
not seem to distinguish between human rights violations committed
with this confusion, and tend to invoke norms that correspond with the national
preference .... Rules of deference are a formal way to confess the untrustworthy
quality of a judicial application of substantive norms of international law in areas
of legitimate diversity."
R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 75
(1964). For a discussion of the advantages of deference to the Executive, see id at 8-9. A
court may also decline jurisdiction due to an inadequate base of federal interest, as did the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Verlinden B. V v. Central Bank of
Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320, 326 (2d Cir. 1981).
27. [T~he courts should not close their doors where human rights are violated, even
if an act of state is in question. The act of state doctrine should be used as an
analytic tool, as the line of demarcation between judicial deference to the diverse
elements of economic regulation on the one hand, and the protection of fundamen-
tal human rights on the other.
Christenson, supra note 23, at 1015.
28. 376 U.S. at 428.
29. Professor Falk states:
municipal courts should avoid interference in the domestic affairs of other states
when the subject matter of dispute illustrates a legitimate diversity of values on the
part of two national societies. In contrast, if the diversity can be said to be illegiti-
mate, as when it exhibits an abuse of universal human rights, then domestic courts
fulfill their role by refusing to further the policy of the foreign legal system. In
instances of illegitimate diversity, where a genuine universal sentiment exists, then
the domestic courts properly act as agents of the international order only if they
give maximum effect to such universality.
R. FALK, supra note 26, at 72. See also id at 9-10, 18.
30. Commenting on the Supreme Court's decision in Sabbatlino, Professor Lillich states,
"by refusing to clarify and apply the relevant international law standards, the Court actually
perpetuates the supposed lack on consenses so damaging to customary international law."
Lillich, The Proper Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order, 11 VA. J. INT'L
L. 9, 33 (1970). He further advocates that the courts "should eschew the extreme deference
exhibited by the Supreme Court in Sabbatino," and that executive and legislative infringe-
ments on the role of the judiciary be eliminated as soon as possible. Id at 49. Lillich's
viewpoint eschewing deference is in sharp contrast to Falk's belief that "rules of deference
applied by domestic courts advance the development of international law faster than does an
indiscriminate insistence upon applying challenged substantive norms in order to determine
the validity of the official acts of foreign states." R. FALK, supra note 26, at 6-7.
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USES OF HUMA4N RIGHTS NORMS
within a state's own territory and national social and economic policies
for the promotion of international welfare that might violate the princi-
ple of just compensation.3 He recommends an activist role for the
courts in both types of cases. The furor over Mr. Lefever's nomination
as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and other events also
indicate that a strong segment of the public wants no deference ac-
corded to acts of states that violate human rights. In contrast, the acts
of foreign states in economic and social policy are more controversial
and would seem to command greater deference in order to maintain
orderly relations between nation-states, even where just compensation
is owed between governments for expropriations.
In addition to the difference between fundamental human rights
and economic or social policies, a second distinction must be made.
Compensating individuals whose human rights have been violated
32
differs from imposing sanctions or exerting pressure on a state as pun-
ishment for violating human rights.33 Professor Lillich favors judicial
activism in both sanctions and compensation cases.3" While deference
to the Executive, especially in human rights matters, can be uncon-
scionable,35 deference may arguably be proper in asserting sanctions or
pressure on a foreign nation under the wide discretion and flexibility
available to the Executive.36 Human rights norms are among several
international interests which must be protected. If the act of state doc-
trine is not used because a compensable violation of human rights is at
issue, the courts must decide what the rule of decision will be.37 In
Fiartiga, Judge Kaufman separated the issue of compensation from
the question of federal jurisdiction (which was the only question he
decided), commenting that the choice of law inquiry is much broader; it
is primarily concerned with fairness.
31
31. See Christenson, supra note 23, at 1017; R. FALK, supra note 26, at 6.
32. E.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, supra note 1; Fernandez v. Wilkinson, supra note 2.
33. Eg., Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931
(1973); Diggs v. CAB, 516 F.2d 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976); New
York Times Co. v. City of New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 79 Misc. 2d 1046, 362
N.Y.S.2d 321 (Sup. Ct. 1974), af'd, 49 A.D. 2d 851, 374 N.Y.S.2d 9 (App. Div. 1974), aftd,
41 N.Y.2d 345, 361 N.E.2d 963, 393 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1977); South African Airways v. New
York Div. of Human Rights, 64 Misc. 2d 707, 315 N.Y.S.2d 651 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
34. Lillich, The Role of Domestic Courts in Promoting International Human Rights
Norms, 24 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 153, 172 (1978).
35. For an example of questionable deference to the Executive, see Haig v. Agee, 101 S.
Ct. 2766 (1981).
36. See R. FALK, supra note 26, at 8-9. But see Reisman, Foreign Affairs andthe Several
States: Outline ofa Theoryfor Decision, 71 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROCS. 182, 188-80 (1977).
37. Professor Henkin explores the relationship between this choice of law question and
the act of state doctrine in Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility, 6
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175, 178 (1967).
38. 630 F.2d at 889.
1981]
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HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS AND CHOICE OF LAW
One of the ambiguities (presumably conscious) in Judge Kauf-
man's opinion is the question of whether international law itself may
be the norm creating the rule of decision when it is also a base for
jurisdiction. The Court left the choice of law determination of
whether torture violates Paraguayan law for adjudication on remand to
the federal district court.39 The interest of the international community
in the orderly relations between states does not only mean applying
human rights standards in domestic adjudication.4" Respect for the lex
delecti is a deference to order as well. The role of the domestic court in
choice of law matters is to give respect and deference to the law of the
place of injury, as well as to international law.4 A United States do-
mestic court must presume that foreign states will not lightly maintain
their domestic laws in conflict with international human rights norms
against official torture. When there is ambiguity in the lex delicti,42 a
proper interpretation would be to avoid conflict with the human rights
norms in choosing the rule of decision. The lex delicti should not be
displaced by using the human rights law against torture as the rule of
decision unless the lex delicti so departs from these human rights norms
that it would upset the peace of nations to apply it.
Through this examination, we can see the possibility of selecting
either the lex delecti or international law as the rule of decision for a
civil wrong in cases under the Alien Tort Act using choice of law prin-
ciples compatible with the policy of the forum.43 When the law of the
39. Judge Kaufman implies that the district court on remand may be required, under
the analysis set forth in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953), to apply Paraguayan law.
That analysis, which considers such factors as place of the wrongful act, allegiance or domi-
cile of the injured, inaccessibility of the foreign forum, and the law of the forum, does ap-
pear to indicate Paraguayan law as the rule of the decision. Id at 583-92.
40. Prominent among the factors to be considered in deciding choice of law are the
needs of the international system. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 6 (1971).
"Choice-of-law rules. . . should seek to further harmonious relations between states.
Id, comment d, at 13.
41. One commentator has concluded that in § 1350 cases, international law should be
chosen as the rule of decision in order to protect the international community's interest in
upholding international values. 49 FORDHAM L. REv., supra note 5, at 885. The note is
excellent in its technical argument, but it fails to reconcile that portion with other legitimate
interests of the international community, such as the orderly, harmonious relations between
states.
42. Although the Constitution and laws of Paraguay prohibit torture, CONSTITUCION
PARAGUAYA (Para.) art. 65, it is still carried on by the Ministry of the Interior and the
Department of Crimes and Vigilance. See Amnesty International, Report on Torture 174-76
(1st ed. 1973); 630 F.2d at 889-90. It has been argued that torture cannot be a violation of
international law because the position of nations on torture are contradicted by their deeds.
49 U. CIN. L. Rnv., supra note 5, at 889-90. For a rebuttal of this argument, see Blum &
Steinhardt, supra note 5, at 79-82.
43. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971) lists the following
as factors to be considered in choice of law decisions: the relevant policies of the forum, the
HeinOnline  -- 4 Hous. J. Int'l L. 46 1981-1982
 I NAL   
      
 iti s l    
'    r l  
      
  ti   
    ti    
 3  l  
l      
   40   
ti      i    
      
tional 1   
  i  
 l    
     ti,42  
ti      
   i   
   f 
  i t     
   . 
 ,    
 ti     
  
l   .43    
.       r 
 . ,    
   l  
i ilit    
    .  
t    
   )   1). 
- f-la  s.     . . ." 
., t . 
.  t t r s l  t t i    s s, i t r ti al l  s l   
  t ti nal  
 i l    
    ,          t  
i t t   t  i t ti l it ,   t  l , i  l ti s t en 
 
. lt  t  tit ti   l    i it t t , I I  
YA p .  . , i  i   i           
t t  i   i il .  t  ternational, t  t re  
l      t f 
i t ti l l   t  iti   ti   t t   t i ted  t i  . 
 . I . . E ., ra t  , t .   tt l  t i  t,  l   
t,   ,  
  )  1)   
 t  t   i  i  i   l  i i : t  l t li i   t  , t  
1981] USES OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS
forum is premised upon respect for fundamental human rights,44 the
reconciliation of the choice of law will rest heavily upon the judgment
of whether the law of the foreign state is compatible with both the law
of the forum and international human rights law.45 If it is not compati-
ble, only then would the court face the question of whether an in-
dependent private cause of action might emerge through a rule of
decision premised upon the human rights norm outlawing torture.46
There is only a possibility, then, that international law itself may
be used as the norm creating the rule of decision." The part of federal
common law incorporating international law, however, is not necessar-
ily a rule of decision.48 Compatible with both common law tort and
constitutional tort,49 federal common law would support establishing as
the rule of decision either the civil law of Paraguay against torture or,
possibly, a universal norm of international law analogous to our own
constitutional tort standard.5" Use of a universal norm would interpose
relevant policies of other interested states, and the basic policies underlying the particular
field of law. In Leflar's view, there are important governmental interests, such as human
rights and the maintenance of international order, which include considerations that may be
relevant to choice of law. These considerations can transcend the individual case and some-
times should override local interests in applying local law. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CON-
FLICTS LAW § 60 (3d ed. 1977).
44. The policy of the United States, the forum in Filartiga, of respect for fundamental
human rights is evident in our own constitutional litigation and in our recognition of univer-
sal norms against torture, piracy, and the slave trade. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RE-
LATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981). See also the
Comment and Reporter's Notes for § 404.
45. "If under accepted choice of law principles the foreign law should govern, the court
could still refuse to apply that law if it were found to be contrary to the public policy of the
forum." Henkin, supra note 37, at 178. One commentator has suggested that this principle
could be used to apply Paraguayan law as it is written, rather than as it is enforced. See 33
STAN. L. REv., supra note 5, at 362-63.
46. For a discussion of whether international human rights law can create a private
cause of action, see 33 STAN. L. REv., supra note 5, at 358-59. See also authorities cited
supra note 8.
47. For the view that international law should be the rule of decision in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 cases, see Alien Tort Statute, supra note 5, at 881-89. Professor Lillich advocates a
strong role for the judiciary in clarifying and applying international law, free of legislative
and executive infringements, and has been critical of the courts' reluctance to assume this
responsibility. See Lillich, supra note 30,passim.
48. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 887, where Judge Kaufman states his belief that
it was sufficient in that case to construe the Alien Tort Statute "not as granting new rights to
aliens, but simply as opening the federal courts for adjudication of the rights already recog-
nized by international law."
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
50. Professors von Mehren and Trautman have advocated that when the law of a single
jurisdiction is inadequate, the court should fashion a law which represents a "normal sub-
stantive-law rule. . . widely shared in the legal world to which the concerned jurisdictions
(including the forum) belong." Trautman, The Relation Between American Choice of Law
andFederal Common Law, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 105, 105 (Spring 1977). This theory
is discussed in Alien Tort Statute, supra note 5, at 886-87. See generally, von Mehren, Special
Substantive Rulesfor Multistate Problems: Their Role and Signffcance in Contemporary
Choice oLaw Methodology, 88 HARV. L. REv. 347 (1974). An approach such as that advo-
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international law between two aliens, one of whom acted under the
color of authority of a foreign state, if, once personal jurisdiction is
properly exercised, the civil wrong also might be adjudicated in some
other forum under a universal rule of decision.-'
A universal rule of decision, premised upon the human rights
norm outlawing torture,52 might well be read into the tort standard it-
self and be incorporated into substantive federal common law53
through the jurisdictional statute. 4 It is far from clear that the Alien
Tort Statute itself did not create a separate cause of action.55 By con-
struing the statute to create a federal remedy for tort whenever a viola-
tion of international law involves a universally recognized wrong, the
need for a choice of law subsides except to give respect to similar lex
delecti, provided they meet the standard of the universal norm.5 6 We
cated by Trautman and von Mehren was criticized in Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-
Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REv. 173, 193 n.35 (1933).
51. "A state may exercise jurisdiction to define and punish certain offenses recognized
by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on
or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps terrorism, even where none of the
bases of jurisdiction indicated in § 402 is present." RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404, supra note 44. See also the Comments and Reporter's
Notes following § 404, discussing the expansion of the class of offenses which customary law
may come to accept as subject to universal jurisdiction.
52. This universal rule of decision is reminiscent of the doctrine of hostes humani
generis prominent in the 18th and 19th centuries. In Filartiga, Judge Kaufman refers to this
doctrine in his statement, "for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become-like the
pirate and slave trader before him-hostis (sic) humani generis, an enemy of all mankind."
630 F.2d at 890. For a discussion of this doctrine and its resurgence in modern human rights
law, see Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 5, at 60-62, 68.
53. The practical effect of this choice is, in some cases, to impose liability on a
defendant when the domestic law of the country that would be chosen under tradi-
tional territorial based theories would not find him liable. Nevertheless, it is not
unfair to hold individuals to international standards of conduct. Because conduct
that is determined to be in violation of international law is universally condemned,
individuals should reasonably expect to be held accountable for egregious conduct
that violates the norm.
Alien Tort Statute, supra note 5, at 888-89.
54. The jurisdictional statute in Filartiga is 28 U.S.C. § 1350. For a discussion of the
possibility noted earlier in the text, see Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 5, at 98-102.
55. Although Judge Kaufman did not construe the Alien Tort Statute as granting new
rights to aliens (see note 48 supra) he did admit that such a construction is possible, citing
Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at
887; see also Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 5, at 98-102. But see Dreyfuss v. von Finck, 534
F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976). "[Sections 1331 and 1350] do
not create a cause of action for a plaintiff seeking recovery under a treaty;" Comment, 37
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1263, 1264 (1980) ("Section 1350 does not create a federal cause of
action").
56. We could revive the good old quarrel between the dualists and monists in interna-
tional law. For an examination of the differences in these views, see O'CONNELL, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 37-42 (1970). Oppenheim espouses the dualist's view in L. OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 37-38 (1955). For the monist's outlook, see H. KELSEN,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 553-54 (W. Tucker ed. 1966). For discussions of the
relationship between international law and domestic law in the United States, see D.
O'Connell, id at 61-65; Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the
United States (pts. 1-2), 101 U. PA. L. REv. 26, 792 (1952-1953); see Lillich, supra note 30, at
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1981] USES OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS
do not address here the more troublesome doctrine offorum non-con-
veniens, although, as a non-constitutional matter, human rights norms
might also inform the court when to decline jurisdiction when no other
forum is available.
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF "PERSONS" AND "DUE PROCESS"
In Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 7 we see another constitutional use of
international law in the evolution of the meaning of "persons" pro-
tected under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and, presumably, the
Fourteenth Amendments. 8 In Fernandez, the district court found itself
confronted with the "arbitrary detention" in a federal maximum secur-
ity prison of a Cuban refugee for whom "the machinery of domestic
law utterly fails to operate to assure protection."5 9 The refugee, who
arrived on the "freedom flotilla" in June 1980, had been determined
excludable by immigration officials, but his deportation proved impos-
sible due to Cuba's refusal to readmit any of the refugees.60 No statu-
tory or regulatory procedures, other than parole, existed with regard to
excludable aliens who were not immediately deportable.6 1 Temporary
detention of such aliens is sanctioned by statute and court decision.6
A refugee, seeking a writ of habeas corpus, could not look to the Con-
stitution for protection due to a revered fiction that keeps aliens, ex-
cludable but present in United States territory, from being included in
the class of persons accorded constitutional protection.
63
12-18. On the one side, the dualists would use the human rights norm outlawing torture
only as a base of universal jurisdiction to prescribe domestic remedies for civil wrongs in
violation of the norm. On the other side, the monists would select and apply the precise
primary rule for decision either under municipal law or by using the universal international
law norm that initially formed the base for exercising jurisdiction in the first place.
57. 505 F. Supp. at 787.
58. "[N]or shall any person.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
59. 505 F. Supp. at 795.
60. Id at 788-89.
61. Id at 792.
62. Id at 791.
63. The fiction excluding these particular aliens from constitutional protection is an old
one, resting on status. One's rights under the old Roman law of persons also depended
directly on one's status. And while, since that time, we have moved considerably from "sta-
tus" to "contract," a noticeable revival of functional status has occurred to resolve various
problems through the use of legal fictions. Consider for example, the use of status of con-
sumers qua consumers, members of a class in a products liability suit; or one's "status" as a
member of a protected minority or group being excluded from certain benefits by
majoritarian legislation. The fiction is based on the premise that excludable aliens have not
been admitted into the United States and therefore are not technically within its jurisdiction.
This fiction which is the functional equivalent of treating aliens as non-persons, may be
overcome by using human rights norms to interpret the word "person" in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. See notes 64-66 infra and accompanying text.
The precise argument must be narrow and should not suggest that all preventive deten-
tion should be barred. Even under human rights norms, some detention of excludable aliens
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EXCLUDABLE ALIENS AS PERSONS UNDER FIFTH AMENDMENT
Like Filartiga, the significance of Fernandez lies also at several
levels. The first level artfully uses human rights law to accord protec-
tion to a narrow group of persons who has not been protected by the
Fifth Amendment because, fictionally, they are non-persons. 64 The
language of the Fifth Amendment says that "no person" may be denied
due process; it does not say "no citizen or legally admitted alien." Uni-
versal recognition of all human beings as persons to be protected from
abuse provides a narrow base to fill a gap in United States constitu-
tional law without the need to challenge directly the validity of rela-
tively recent Supreme Court decisions. 6 Furthermore, the concept of
human dignity inherent in human rights norms buttresses a more inclu-
sive definition of "person." Using such a concept, the district court
used an expanded definition to inform a constitutional interpretation,
rather than challenge the relevance of prior Supreme Court decisions
and risk being overturned for failure to follow court discipline and
supervision.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed this deci-
sion, illustrating the wisdom of the district court's approach. 66 The in-
teresting aspect of this narrow use of international law for
constitutional interpretation is that it would have been quite unneces-
sary to find and apply human rights law had the Supreme Court given
proper meaning to "persons" under the Fifth Amendment. In future
cases, the gap-filling use of human rights norms may provide lower
is permissible. Detention should be prohibited only when it is not related to a compelling
interest in protecting the public. The detention must not be arbitrary or unreasonably long
in relation to the time needed to determine what should be done with the alien. The human
rights norm provides a way in which balances can be drawn; however, its use must not be
overstated.
The district court traces the history of the fiction that excludable aliens are not entitled
to constitutional protection through the federal case law at 505 F. Supp. at 790. The princi-
ple has been upheld in Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67
(1976); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953); Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
64. The Court in Fernandez was "unwilling to initiate the corrosion of this venerable
legal doctrine by holding that the force of the fiction diminishes" as the time which an
excluded alien is detained increases. 505 F. Supp. at 790. Such a holding was unnecessary
because the court found that [o]ur review of the sources from which customary international
law is derived clearly demonstrates that arbitrary detention is prohibited by customary inter-
national law. Therefore, even though the indeterminate detention of an excluded alien can-
not be said to violate the United States Constitution or our statutory laws, it is judicially
remedial as a violation of international law.
505 F. Supp. at 798. The sources of customary international law reviewed by the court are
listed in note 68 infra.
65. See cases supra note 63.
66. 654 F.2d 1382.
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19811 USES OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS
federal courts a tool to displace obsolete Supreme Court decisions on
the status of some aliens as non-persons.
ARBITRARY DETENTION STANDARDS FOR UNPROTECTED PERSONS
The second level of the Fernandez decision is the substantive use
of human rights law in defining a standard against arbitrary detention
for a group of persons otherwise unprotected by the Fifth Amend-
ment.67 As in Filartiga, the district court looked to positive sources as
evidence of a fundamental human right to be free from arbitrary deten-
tion.68 The court did not have to invoke "natural law" to fill this nar-
row gap in protection because it went no further than required to find
and apply a particular norm.69 Yet, such a leap into natural law would
be required if we were to infer from such a limited application of this
source of law that the entire corpus of human rights norms is thereby
directly incorporated into United States constitutonal law, as some
human rights advocates have insisted."0 That the court did not make
67. Following its review of the sources of customary international law, the district court
held the following:
the indeterminate detention of petitioner in a maximum security federal prison
under conditions providing less freedom than that granted to ordinary inmates
constitutes arbitrary detention and is a violation of customary international law;
and that the continuation of such detention is an abuse of discretion on the part of
the Attorney General and his delegates.
505 F. Supp. at 800.
68. The district court, citing Filartiga, stated that "[pirinciples of customary interna-
tional law may be discerned from an overview of express international conventions, the
teachings of legal scholars, the general custom and practice of nations and relevant judicial
decisions." 505 F. Supp. at 798. The Fernandez court's review of the sources of customary
international law included the United Nations Charter, signed June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031,
T.S. No 993; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), 3 U.N.
GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), and the views of legal scholars that the Universal Declara-
tion, through its wide acceptance, has become binding customary law; the American Con-
vention on Human Rights, signed Nov. 22, 1969, OAS T.S. No. 36, OAS O.R. OEA/Ser. L/
V/II.23 doc. 21 rev. 6 (1979), O.R. OEA/Ser. A/16; The Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (1968);
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, openedfor signature Dec. 19, 1966,
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) (The
court cited these last three documents as "indicative of the customs and usages of civilized
nations." 505 F. Supp. at 797.) The court also quoted Congressman Donald M. Frasier and
Patricia M. Derian, former Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanita-
rian Affairs, as members of the Congress and Executive Department who have recognized
an international legal right to freedom from arbitrary detention. Id at 797-98. Further-
more, the district court, citing France ex rel. Madame Julien Chevreau, stated that
"[tiribunals enforcing international law have also recognized arbitrary detention as giving
rise to a legal claim." 505 F. Supp. at 798.
69. See R. FALK, supra note 26, at 1. But see Comment, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1263,
1269-79 (1980) suggesting that recent developments in the human rights field indicate that
natural law theory still has some validity.
For a discussion of the competing directions of natural law and legal positivism, see L.
FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940). For a modern theory of natural law, see J.
FiNNis, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHrS (1980).
70. See, e.g, 1 The Law Group Docket 7, supra note 6.
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such a leap considerably strengthens the growth of fundamental human
rights recognition. This pattern of growth through particular interpre-
tation of discrete rights is new neither to the common law tradition nor
to its civil law counterpart. It is remarkably similar to the preference in
Bill of Rights litigation for considering each fundamental right sepa-
rately and rejecting Justice Black's theory of wholesale incorporation of
the first eight amendments into the Fourteenth.7 One at a time, funda-
mental rights have developed through constitutional adjudication.72
These have been made directly applicable to state action by careful
judicial craftsmanship in the use of one or more of the open-ended
provisions limiting the majoritarian power of all government.73 The
remarkable explosion of individual rights and liberties through case
law is preferable and more sure through acquiescence than wholesale
incorporation of an abstract code.
EQUAL PROTECTION
An opportunity for further use of human rights norms to inform
constitutional interpretation is presented in Doe v. Poyler, now before
the Supreme Court.74 By statute, Texas declined to provide financial
aid for the education of alien children unable to document the legality
of their presence .7  A local school district implemented this statute by
charging undocumented alien children $1,000 annual tuition.76 The
policy and the Texas statute were challenged by a group of these
71. Justice Black's most famous exposition of his incorporationist theory was in his dis-
sent in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947), wherein he states that "the original
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment [was] to extend to all the people of the nation the
complete protection of the Bill of Rights." Id at 89. This theory was rejected by the major-
ity in Adamson: "The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not draw all
the rights of the federal Bill of Rights under its protection. That contention was made and
rejected in Palko v. Connecticut." Id. at 53. Palko held that only those provisions of the Bill
of Rights which were "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" became valid against the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Palko Y. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
In Palko, federal double jeopardy standards were held not applicable to the states. Id at
328. This was overruled in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-94 (1969).
For commentary and discussion of the incorporation debate, see J. ELY, supra note 3 at
24-8; G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 476-501 (10th ed.
1980); W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: CASES-
COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 505-33 (3d ed. 1970); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
567-69 (1978). The historical background of the Fourteenth Amendment and an anti-in-
corporationist viewpoint are set forth in Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorpo-
rate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).
72. See generally, Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73
YALE L.J. 74 (1963).
73. See supra, note 3.
74. Doe v. Pyler, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981).
75. 628 F.2d at 449-50.
76. Id at 450.
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children."
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the application of
the statute to undocumented alien children was a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 8 While the
Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the question of whether
the guarantee of equal protection extends to illegal aliens, dicta in cases
like Wong Wing v. United States79 indicate that it does. The Court of
Appeals recognized that illegal aliens are "persons" within the jurisdic-
tion of the state in which they reside and, therefore, are covered by the
language of the Fourteenth Amendment.80
In Poler, as in Fernandez, individuals had been denied constitu-
tional protection by reason of their status set forth in a statutory classi-
fication.81 Human rights advocates h?ve sought recognition of a right
of free access to public education for all children, by invoking positive
sources of human rights law.82 These claims unnecessarily go beyond
what is essential to inform the guarantee of equal protection. While no
Supreme Court decision has ever recognized a constitutional right to
education,83 once a state decides to provide free public education, it
may not lightly exclude some children from the privilege. 84 When chil-
dren are denied education by states based solely on their status as ille-
gal aliens, I would argue that human rights provisions binding upon
states require strict scrutiny of this discriminatory classifications. This
argument seems stronger than to insist that recognition of an autono-
mous human rights norm, not previously recognized in United States
constitutional law, limits state action. I have no doubt that such a
norm should and does constitute a limitation on state action in a proper
case, if the strict scrutiny standard of equal protection should fail.
77. Id
78. Id This comment, limited to the constitutional uses of human rights norms, does
not address the foreign affairs preemption argument presented to the court. See id at 451-
54. Though the argument may be valid, the stronger argument for individual rights is made
via the Fourteenth Amendment, discussed below.
79. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896).
80. 628 F.2d at 455.
81. I d at 454.
82. The following international instruments recognize a right to education: Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, art. 26(1), G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948);
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 13(1), entered into
force Jan. 3, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/
6316 (1967); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation in Education, arts. 3(e) 4; Declaration of the Rights of the Child, principle 7.
83. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In
RodriSuez, the majority did not consider access to education to be a fundamental interest
requiring strict scrutiny.
84. It should be remembered that the statute in Ply/er denies free public education, a
primary value, to the children of persons who illegally entered the country, an act for which
the parents, not the children, are responsible. See 628 F.2d at 457.
1981]
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Discriminatory classifications based on race, sex, and legal alien-
age trigger strict, or at least heightened, scrutiny. The class of excluda-
ble aliens may also require a heightened scrutiny above rational basis.
The question in Plyler is whether classification schemes for discrimina-
tory treatment of the children of illegal aliens require a more substan-
tial or compelling governmental interest than normally would pass
muster under standards of deference to state action.
One method of approaching this question is to examine the right
being abridged by the discriminatory classification. Human rights
norms indicate the consensus of civilized nations that education and
nondiscrimination are important values. A discriminatory classifica-
tion that burdens a fundamental value recognized by these interna-
tional norms should be enough, under well established principles of
equal protection, to trigger heightened scrutiny of that classification.
Professor Covey Oliver has argued that human rights advocates
sometimes overstate or, more precisely, fail to shape their arguments
with sufficient skill to guard against losing ground if an appellate court
can easily dismiss the argument. I disagree with his conclusion if it
counsels timidity in the face of Bricker Amendment-type retaliation,
even though I agree with his tactical point. The use of human rights
norms to support constitutional claims can be crafted with better skill.
Rather than using human rights norms as an independent or alterna-
tive basis for a claim of denial of fundamental rights, those same norms
should be used in a lawyer-like manner to interpret existing constitu-
tional standards. In equal protection claims, then, a brief might argue
why stricter scrutiny should prevail under constitutional theory when
discriminatory classifications also intrude on fundamental human
rights of illegal aliens. This argument is less vulnerable to attack than
one which claims, in the alternative, that a discriminatory law must fall
because it violates a treaty standard which is not clearly self-executing
or it violates a customary international law when it is questionable
whether that international norm is part of federal common law.
Presenting a vulnerable, alternative ground to the highest court is the
same as inviting the Court to reject it, especially when it is not neces-
sary to a decision. Using human rights norms for the purpose of but-
tressing a standard of constitutional scrutiny, more strict than it
otherwise might be, is better promotion, ultimately, of human rights
than the martyrdom incurred when the arguments outlined above are
presented. Moreover, now that the United States Department of Jus-
tice has recently, and wrongly, changed its position from challenging
the Texas statute as discriminatory of the children of illegal aliens to
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USES OF HUMAN RI"GHTS NORMS
one of neutrality, it becomes even more important for private groups to
persuasively urge the application of a higher standard of scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
The use of human rights norms in Filartiga and Fernandez, and
their potential use in Pller, may indicate the beginning of intersticial
growth in constitutional interpretation using human rights norms. We
need an adequate framework to aid federal judges in deciding how to
use international sources of basic norms for interpreting constitutional
rights. Without such a framework, any growth is likely to be erratic
and uninformed. Moreover, human rights advocates who argue that
human rights are part of customary international law will be ignored
by those who believe that international human rights norms have no
place in our jurisprudence until the United States accepts binding obli-
gations by ratifying the human rights conventions. This brief comment
offers the following criteria in moving toward an adequate framework:
1) Fundamental human rights norms can be used when
they are established by the traditional sources of customary
international law to form a constitutional nexus for exercising
federal jurisdiction in cases where otherwise the constitutional
basis for exercising jurisdiction might not be sufficient.
2) In choice of law questions involving foreign law,
fundamental human rights norms should be used as the stan-
dard for determining whether to use the law of the other
country, thereby giving it comity and respect, or when the lex
deleeti derogates too greatly from the standards of the forum,
to create a new norm based on the international human rights
standard.
3) In cases of a gap in constitutional protections for
aliens or others, such as in standards prohibiting arbitrary de-
tention, fundamental human rights norms as established by
traditional sources of customary international law may be
used to help fill the lacunae with substantive principles. For
instance, in cases where domestic law might classify present
but excludable aliens as, in effect, "non-persons," fundamen-
tal human rights norms should inform the meaning of "per-
sons" protected under the Due Process and Equal Protection
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
4) In determining what standard of review the judiciary
should apply to legislation which classifies unprotected aliens
or other persons in a seemingly discriminatory manner, fun-
damental human rights norms established by traditional
sources of customary international law should be used to sup-
port a heightened or strict standard of scrutiny.
1981]
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Use of criteria, such as those briefly outlined above, will aid the new
process of using human rights norms to inform interstitial growth in
constitutional law.
The process of innovation in a discipline-be it scientific, techno-
logical, or economic-is one of rejuvenation from outside, beginning
with new growth at the narrowest point; it is nucleation and displace-
ment. The process exemplifies the idea that valid change occurs mainly
from the outside-as in the use of dissent-and that displacement oc-
curs not grandly but interstitially, beginning with incorporation of only
the most fundamental human rights norms in the most narrow crevices.
Even that great positivist, Hans Kelsen, recognized that when gaps in
positive law exist, judges should have discretion to use universal princi-
ples as guides to decision, and thereby judge-made law might come
into existence as a new positive law source."
The human rights lawyer of the future will be a new brand of war-
rior: a highly skilled advocate and artist, locating these gaps and crev-
ices and creating a legal construct so persuasive that, fueled by the
denial of justice, the implantation of ideas in the interstice will grow
and rejuvenate the spirit of the law from within its very core. The
enormously creative craft of judicial interpretation can more safely and
85. If there is no norm of conventional or customary international law imposing
upon the state (or another subject of international law) the obligation to behave in
a certain way, the subject is under international law legally free to behave as it
pleases; and by a decision to this effect existing international law is applied to the
case. But this decision, though logically possible, may be morally or politically not
satisfactory. Only in this sense are there "gaps" in the international as in any legal
order.
The assumption that the law-applying organs are authorized to fill such gaps,
by applying to the particular case norms other than those of existing conventional
or customary international law, implies that the law-applying organs have the
power to create new law for a concrete case if they consider the application of
existing law as unsatisfactory. From the point of view of legal positivism, such a
law-creating power must be based on a rule of positive international law .... The
rule authorizing the law-applying organs not to apply existing law but to create a
new law in case the application of existing law is, though logically possible, mor-
ally or politically unsatisfactory, confers an extraordinary lawmaking power upon
the law-applying organs. It is doubtful whether the writers who adhere to the
traditional doctrine of "gaps in international law" are aware of the consequence of
this doctrine when they maintain the existence of rules of general international law
conferring upon the states and agencies competent to apply international law the
power to fill the gaps .... It is from this point of view that the provision of Arti-
cle 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice is to be understood: that
the Court "whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply" not only conventional and customary
international law but also "the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations."
H. KELSEN, supra note 56, at 438-40. See also H. KELSEN, PuRE THEORY OF LAW 353-55
(Knight trans. 1967); H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 145-49 (A.
Wedberg trans. 1961).
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surely show the way for the vast revolution now upon us than endless
political action and debate.
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